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Abstract
Approximating a Nash equilibrium is currently the best
performing approach for creating poker-playing programs.
While for the simplest variants of the game, it is possible to
evaluate the quality of the approximation by computing the
value of the best response strategy, this is currently not com-
putationally feasible for larger variants of the game, such as
heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em. In this paper, we present a
simple and computationally inexpensive Local Best Response
method for computing an approximate lower bound on the
value of the best response strategy. Using this method, we
show that existing poker-playing programs, based on solv-
ing abstract games, are remarkably poor Nash equilibrium
approximations.
One very popular measure for progress in artificial intel-
ligence is computers’ performance in recreational games
commonly played by humans. There has been a dramatic
sequence of successes in the past two decades starting
with Chinook with checkers (Schaeffer et al. 1996), Deep
Blue with chess (Campbell, Hoane, and Hsu 2002), Watson
with Jeopardy! (Ferrucci et al. 2013), and AlphaGo with
go (Silver et al. 2016). Despite these successes, poker has
proven to be a harder challenge for AI. Similar to checkers,
chess, and go, poker can be easily and completely described
by a simple set of rules. The size of the game ranges from
being smaller than checkers (heads-up limit Texas hold’em;
HULH) to as large as go (heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em;
HUNL). However, it is a substantially more complex game
due to the element of imperfect information. In poker, some
information is private to specific players. Players need to in-
fer the private information of others based on their actions in
the game, while also seeking to avoid losing their own strate-
gic advantage by revealing their private information via their
actions. This is complicated by the fact that the information
revealed by an opponents’ play depends on their behaviour,
and that behaviour naturally depends on the player’s own
private information.
Like other popular games, poker has been a chal-
lenge problem in artificial intelligence since the incep-
tion of the field (Kuhn 1950; Koller and Pfeffer 1997;
Billings et al. 2002). Recent progress in approxi-
mating Nash equilibria in massive extensive-form
games (Gilpin et al. 2007; Zinkevich et al. 2008;
Lanctot et al. 2009; Tammelin et al. 2015) has allowed
for some initial successes in the smallest variant of poker
played by humans, HULH. Polaris, a program built around
the CFR-family of methods, defeated professional poker
players for the first time in a meaningful match of HULH
in 2008 (Rehmeyer, Fox, and Rico 2008). In 2015, this
was taken a step further by the program Cepheus, which
essentially solved the game the HULH, with the resulting
strategy requiring 11TB of storage and using over 900 CPU
years of computation (Bowling et al. 2015).
The size of the game of HULH, though, is trivial com-
pared to the more popular no-limit variants of the game.
In limit poker variants, there are at most 3 different ac-
tions available to a player at any situation (fold, check/call,
bet/raise) as all bet amounts are fixed in advance. In no-limit
games, players can bet any number of remaining chips, lead-
ing to thousands of possible actions from a single situation.
As a result, HUNL can have over 10160 decision points in
the game, as in the case of the variant played in the An-
nual Computer Poker Competition (ACPC) 1. This makes
HULH’s size of 1014 decision points seem trivial.
Much of the progress in HULH was enabled by the abil-
ity to measure the approximation quality of a strategy in
HULH (Johanson et al. 2011). This has been a challenge
for research in HUNL where to date evaluation has been
limited to tournament evaluation,where strategies are eval-
uated by having them play against each other. The results
of such a tournament are necessarily relative and cannot
give an absolute strength of any particular program. Fur-
thermore, it can substantially depend on small details in
the design of the tournament, such as the winnings cap
used in the ACPC (Bard 2016). The absolute measure of
performance through computing a strategy’s approxima-
tion quality made possible a number of important strides
in HULH research, for example, investigating the effect
of restricted opponent modelling, asymmetric abstractions
(Bard, Johanson, and Bowling 2014), translation, and pay-
off tilts (Johanson et al. 2011).
This paper presents a simple method to quickly approx-
imate a lower-bound to a strategy’s exploitability in the
HUNL game. It is trivial to parallelize, makes no card ab-
straction commitments, can be applied even to strategies
that use dynamic (and expensive) endgame solving tech-
1www.computerpokercompetition.org
niques, and can probe a far larger portion of the total betting
space than any current techniques use in their solving ap-
proach. Using this technique, we compare a number of the
top HUNL programs from the ACPC. We show that even
though the differences among the top performing agents in
the ACPC are tiny fractions of a blind per hand, the ex-
ploitability of the players is several whole blinds per hand.
For every program tested, it would be far less exploitable
to immediately fold every hand than to use even such a
state-of-the-art startegy. Furthermore, we can tease apart the
source of the approximation error, observing that consider-
ably more exploitability can be attributed to card abstraction
as opposed to betting abstraction.
Current No-Limit Poker Bots
While we are aware there are poker programs (or bots) play-
ing online in real money games, this paper focuses on bots
submitted to the ACPC. These bots are developed by top
research teams, use principled AI approaches, and the tech-
niques they use are to large extent well documented.
Heads-up No-Limit Texas Hold’em
Heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em is a variant of poker
played with a standard deck of 52 cards. At the beginning
of each hand or game, the first player enters a big blind into
the pot; the second player enters half of that size, or the small
blind; and both players are then dealt two private cards. The
second player then starts the first round of betting. The play-
ers alternate in choosing to fold – ending the game and let-
ting the opponent take the pot; call – matching the amount of
chips entered by the opponent and ending the betting round;
or raise by x – adding x more chips than the opponent to
the pot. A raise of all remaining chips is called an all in bet.
After the first round, three board or public cards are dealt
face up, and the first player now starts an identical round of
betting to the first round. In the third and fourth rounds, one
additional public card is dealt and betting starts again with
the first player. If none of the players folds before the end of
round 4, the game enters show-down: The private cards are
revealed and the pot is won by the player that can compose
the strongest hand of 5 cards using his 2 private and the 5
public cards. A match consist of large number of games, in
which the players alternate their positions as the first and the
second player.
Best ACPC Players
The bots annually submitted to the ACPC include programs
based on hand-crafted rules, learning systems trained on logs
of past games, or advanced linear programming methods.
The bots which have seen the most success in HUNL all
have the same basic structure.
The bots are based on creating a smaller abstract ver-
sion of the game, approximating the equilibrium strategy in
the abstract game, and executing this strategy in the origi-
nal game using a translation method to map real game sit-
uations into the abstraction. The abstract games abstract
card information (called information abstraction) based on
Bot Name Authors Winnings (mBB/h)
Baby Tartanian8 Carnegie Mellon Uni. 0.0 ± 0.0
Slumbot Eric Jackson -11.88 ± 10.33
Act1 Unfold Poker -16.82 ± 14.35
Table 1: ACPC 2016 results.
clustering hands with similar strength and potential to im-
prove after additional cards are dealt. The abstract games
abstract betting information by restricting the available bets
to a small handful, usually expressed as fractions of the
current size of the pot. The most successful bots approxi-
mate the Nash equilibrium in the abstract games using some
variant of the Counterfactual Regret Minimization algorithm
(Zinkevich et al. 2008).
While playing a hand, the bots find the abstract state that
corresponds to (cluster that includes) the current state of the
game represented by the exact private and public cards in
the game. Furthermore, they have to map the real betting
sequence in the game that can use any size bets to the “most
similar” betting sequence represented in the abstraction. The
abstract strategy is queried for the probability distribution
over actions (pot fractions) included in the abstract game
and these are then post-processed and played in the actual
game, if they are applicable. There are many publications
related to each step of this process in the AI literature.
All three top performing players in ACPC 2016 match the
high level description above. Their Instant Runoff Compe-
tition Results are summarized in Table 1. Baby Tartanian8
won the competition, Slumbot lost on average 12 mBB/h in
its matches with the winner and Act1 lost 17 mBB/h on av-
erage against the other two agents.
Local Best Response
This section presents the local best response algorithm for
fast approximation of a lower bound on the exploitability
of no-limit poker strategies. We call the player that com-
putes the best response “LBR”, and its opponent “the oppo-
nent”. The key concept in this algorithm is the probability
that the opponent holds each of the possible private hands,
which we call the opponent’s range. At the very beginning
of the game, it is equally likely that the opponent holds any
pair of private cards, which is not in conflict with the cards
held by the player. The probabilities of actions performed by
the opponent depend on the private hand she holds. There-
fore, with access to the strategy of the opponent, we can use
Bayes’ rule to infer the exact probabilities that the opponent
holds each of the private hands. It is important that there is
no abstraction or other approximation needed to exactly rep-
resent these probabilities. Based on the range, local best re-
sponse greedily approximates best response actions, assum-
ing a simple heuristic for behavior in the future.
Let H be the set of all possible private hands. In HUNL,
each private hand consists of two cards. Ignoring their order-
ing, |H| = 1326. A player’s range is a probability distribu-
tion over hands and we denote it pi : H → [0, 1]. We denote
S the set of public states in the game. Each public state con-
sists of the board cards, the order in which they came, and
LocalBR(pi - range, s ∈ S, hi ∈ H)
1: wp = WpRollout(hi, pi, s)
2: asked = pot−i(s)− poti(s)
3: U(call) = wp · pot(s)− (1− wp) · asked
4: for action a in considered bets / raises do
5: fp = 0
6: for opponent’s hands h−i ∈ H do
7: fp = fp + pi(h−i) · σ(s, h−i, fold)
8: pi′(h) = pi(h) · (1− σ(s, h−i, fold))
9: normalize pi′
10: wp = WpRollout(hi, pi′, s)
11: U(a) = fp · pot(s)+
+(1− fp)· (wp·(pot(s)+a)− (1−wp)·(asked+a))
12: if maxa U(a) > 0 then
13: return argmaxa U(a)
14: else
15: return fold
Figure 1: The algorithm for approximating lower bound on
strategy exploitability.
the complete sequence of bets by both players up to some
point in the game. The strategy of a player is a probability
distribution on actions (fold, call, all different bet sizes) from
A, available to a player: σ : S ×H ×A → [0, 1].
The algorithm does not compute a best response strat-
egy explicitly, but uses its local approximation to directly
play against the evaluated strategy. At the beginning of each
hand, LBR initializes the opponent’s range uniformly for all
private hands that do not include the cards dealt to LBR. Af-
ter each action a of the opponent performed at a public state
s, LBR updates the opponent’s range using her strategy σ:
pi(h) = pi(h) · σ(s, h, a)
and normalizes the distribution to sum to one.
LBR chooses its action to maximize its expected utility,
under the assumption that the game will be checked/called
until the end, unless the opponent folds right after LBR’s
action. The pseudocode is given in Figure 1. First, it com-
putes the probability of winning the current hand if the
game continues until the show-down in function WpRoll-
out. This function exhaustively deals all possible remaining
board cards and computes the mean probability of winning
with hand hi against the opponent’s range pi. The expected
utility of actions is computed with respect to utility 0 for
fold. On line 3, the utility of action call for LBR is computed
as the chips currently in the pot in case LBR wins, and the
negative of the money LBR has to add to the pot in order to
continue playing if it loses. Afterward, the algorithm com-
putes the expected utility for all other considered actions.
These are typically defined as a fixed set of pot fractions,
but they can be arbitrary. For each action, lines 6-8 compute
the probability that the opponent will fold after LBR per-
forms the action given the current range (fp) and the new
range that would hold for the opponent in case she does not
fold (pi′). The expected utility of the action for LBR (line 11)
is computed as getting the whole pot if the opponent folds,
getting the pot and the size of the bet (a) if the opponent
does not fold and LBR wins, and losing the chips asked for
and added otherwise.
This algorithm computes an approximation of the best re-
sponse, looking only one action ahead and assuming that
the players will check until the end of the game after per-
forming the action (and not folding). The main advantage
it exploits is that it perfectly understands the cards it holds
and the state of the game without any abstraction. It may be
easily extended to longer look-ahead or more complicated
heuristics for estimating the value of the remainder of the
game, however, it would substantially increase its compu-
tational requirements and even this simple version is very
effective, as we show in the following section.
Computing Lower Bound on Exploitability
Recall that LBR does not pre-compute the best response ap-
proximation, but rather directly uses it to evaluate an input
strategy. The evaluation consists of playing a large number
of regular poker hands. The cards are dealt randomly as in a
regular game. Every time it is the opponent’s turn to play an
action, her strategy is queried for the right probability distri-
bution and an action is sampled based on the actual private
hand held by the opponent. Every time it is LBR’s turn to
play, it updates the opponent’s range and selects the best ac-
tion based on the LocalBR algorithm in Figure 1 and its pri-
vate hand. The estimate of the exploitability is the average
number of chips LBR wins in these games.
LBR queries the opponent’s strategy for each hand after
each action it considers. Therefore, if we want to run LBR
with n different pot fractions, completing 1 hand with LBR
generally requires at most (n|H|+ 1) times more computa-
tion time than playing a regular match with the strategy. Fur-
thermore, the most expensive computation currently used in
advanced poker bots is endgame solving (Ganzfried 2016),
which solves for all possible hands in one computation. If
this is the dominant part of the computation for a strategy,
LBR evaluation requires approximately (n + 1) times the
computation required for playing a hand. If it is possible to
play a game within few minutes on a single computational
node, it is most likely also feasible to get reliable LBR esti-
mates on a cluster of these nodes.
An important property of this algorithm is that it com-
putes a lower bound on the exploitability of strategies. Since
LBR actually plays a legal poker strategy, it can never win
more in expectation than the worst case opponent of a strat-
egy. Similarly, using longer look-ahead or different heuristic
evaluation, as suggested above, would still have this prop-
erty. Therefore, a strategy with substantially better perfor-
mance against LBR is likely to be closer to an equilibrium.
Sampled soft translation
When mapping the solution of the abstract game
to the actual game played, it may be convenient
to use sampling (Schnizlein, Bowling, and Szafron 2009;
Ganzfried and Sandholm 2013). As a result, it may be diffi-
cult to obtain the exact probability distribution over actions
in a particular public state of the real game. The proposed
local best response method can still work in this situation.
We can approximate the actual distribution by averaging a
Betting Rounds Call 1
2
Call 1
2
Raise Random
fc 1-4 0 7.1 ± 0.5 15.7 ± 0.4
fc 3-4 0 16.2 ± 0.3 2.2 ± 0.7
fcpa 1-4 34.0 ± 0.5 23.1 ± 0.5 39.1 ± 0.6
fcpa 3-4 49.0 ± 0.4 24.4 ± 0.6 80.7 ± 0.7
Table 2: Results of LBR with trivial strategies in BB/h.
larger number of samples of the strategy at the same state. If
we use a new independent sample from the strategy to pick
the actual action played by the opponent, LBR does not learn
any extra information about the action played and therefore
computes a lower bound on the exploitability of the strategy.
Variance reduction
Since the evaluation plays-out standard poker hands,
we can use any of the previously developed vari-
ance reduction techniques (White and Bowling 2009;
Davidson, Archibald, and Bowling 2013; Burch et al. 2017)
to reduce the number of hands required to produce statis-
tically significant results. For the experiments presented in
this paper, we used duplicate matches and imaginary ob-
servations of expected outcomes of all hands the opponent
could hold for a given line of play, instead of just the actual
hand she holds. These two techniques combine to reduce
the size of the confidence intervals by roughly 20% with the
same number of matches.
Experimental evaluation
In this section, we show that the proposed LBR computation
is a fast and effective method to compute a lower bound ap-
proximation on exploitability of no-limit poker strategies.
We present results from running LBR on simple chump
strategies; bots created at University of Alberta for past
ACPCs; the two of the top three bots from the ACPC in
2016; and a huge strategy with a very sparse betting abstrac-
tion, but no card abstraction. Most results in this section will
be presented in milli-big-blinds per hand (mBB/h) or whole
big blinds per hand (BB/h). The evaluation is stochastic;
hence, we also present 95% confidence intervals. In order
to understand the common magnitude of these values, a bot
that always folds as the first action would loose 750 mBB/h.
The results of the one-on-one matches of the best three play-
ers in ACPC 2016 were all decided by less than 24 mBB/h.
In addition to showing the efficiency of the LBR computa-
tion, our experimental results also show that a large portion
of the exploitability uncovered by the tool is caused by card
abstraction. We show that using bets outside of the oppo-
nent’s betting abstraction does add to the bot’s exploitability,
but at a significantly less magnitude.
Chumps
In order to better understand the strengths and limitations of
LBR, we first use it to evaluate simple rule-based strategies
that ignore the cards completely.
First, we consider always calling, regardless of the cards.
A best response (optimal counter-strategy) against this strat-
egy is to wait until all cards are dealt and go all-in if the
probability of winning is higher than 0.5. This strategy gains
on average 1
4
of all players chips per hand. The best response
would go all-in on half of the hands and it would win 3
4
and
lose 1
4
of these bets. With the stack of 200 big blinds used
in the ACPC, the exploitability of the always call strategy is
approximately 50 BB/h.
The results of LBR are presented in Table 2. If we limit
LBR to choose only actions fold or call (note, it has no rea-
son to fold), both players play always call and the expected
value of LBR is 0. If we include any bets, LBR always uses
only the largest one against an opponent that never folds. If
we use LBR in all rounds of the game, LBR gains 33 BB/h.
The reason it does not achieve the best-response value is that
LBR greedily bets all-in as soon as the probability of win-
ning is higher than 0.5. In the situations in which the prob-
ability drops below the threshold until the end of the game,
it loses utility compared to the actual best response. If we
force LBR to call in the first two rounds and allow other bets
only in rounds 3-4, this effect is minimized and LBR gains
almost the whole 50 BB/h. If we use LBR only in the last
round and call in the remaining 3, LBR actually gets the full
50 BB/h in expectation.
Second chump strategy we evaluate is calling with 50%
of actions and playing a random raise otherwise. Since this
strategy raises often, LBR can already gain several blinds
per hand even using only fold and call. Even with this strat-
egy, checking until more public cards are dealt increases the
performance of LBR. Overall, this strategy seems to be less
exploitable than always calling, since it forces LBR to fold
and to commit more chips with less information about the
cards.The results in Table 2 show that LBR can already gain
several blinds per hand.
The last chump strategy we evaluate is a random legal
action. This strategy is most exploitable. The reason is that
after the all in bet, only fold and call are legal actions. Hence,
the bot will fold half of his hands in this situation, even the
hands it would otherwise clearly win.
ACPC agents
We continue with evaluating the agents from past ACPC
competitions. All these agents are based on solving a smaller
abstract game by CFR and using a translation mechanism to
use the strategy in the full game. The agents differ mainly in
construction of the abstract game and modifications of the
CFR algorithm to speed-up convergence at relevant parts of
the game. The specific bots are Hyperborean 2013 and 2014
created by the University of Alberta, and the second and
third best performing bots from ACPC2016. We approached
the authors of all three placing submissions from the com-
petition, but only the two were able to support this evalu-
ation before the paper deadline. Furthermore, the winning
submission used purification to meet the competition disk
limit (Brown and Sandholm 2016) and therefore we expect
it to be highly exploitable.
Table 3 summarizes the results. We evaluate the play-
ers with LBR’s betting restricted to just fold and call (fc);
fold, call, pot, and all in (fcpa); the bets that are used by
the agent in its abstract game solution (on-tree); and fold,
Betting Rounds Hyp. 2013 Hyp. 2014 Slumbot 2016 Act1 2016 Full Cards
fc 1-4 1048 ± 68 721 ± 56 522 ± 50 407 ± 47 -424 ± 37
fc 3-4 1006 ± 76 608 ± 61 496 ± 55 390 ± 55 -819 ± 52
fcpa 3-4 4040 ± 147 3852 ± 141 4020± 115 2597 ± 140 -536 ± 87
on-tree 3-4 4743 ± 163 4789 ± 156 -536 ± 87
56 bets 1-4 619 ± 117 574 ± 125 763 ± 84 2429 ± 134 1607 ± 76
56 bets 3-4 5062 ± 152 4675 ± 152 3763± 104 3302 ± 122 2403 ± 87
Table 3: Lower bound on exploitability (in mBB/h) of ACPC bots and a bot with no card abstraction and fold-call-pot-all in
betting computed using Local Best Respons restricted to the given betting options and to check/call out of the denoted rounds.
call, all in, and 55 pot fractions computed as 0.05 · (1.15)k
for k = 0 . . . 54 (56bets). If a pot fraction is not applicable,
min-bet or all in is evaluated instead. The column Rounds in
the table defines the rounds (or streets) in which LBR actu-
ally computed the local best response to choose actions. The
remaining rounds were always check/call. All the results are
averaged over 2×50,000 duplicate hands. It means that each
hand was played by each player on the first as well as the
second position to reduce the effect of luck.
The main result is that with 97.5% confidence, ex-
ploitability of each evaluated bot is over 3180 mBB/h. It
means that folding every hand would cost the bots at least
4 times less money than playing their strategy against their
worst case opponent. Second, it is important to wait when
using LBR. If we use all 56 bets from the very beginning,
LBR often exploits the opponent almost a full order of mag-
nitude less than if we force it to check in the first two rounds
and use the 56 bets only afterwards. The reason, as in the
case of always call, is the greedy nature of LBR. It places
large bets too early, without sufficiently exploiting the infor-
mation it might learn later. Alternatively, it pushes the op-
ponent to folds before she places more money in to the pot
to make a larger gain. Third, all bots lose substantially even
if LBR is allowed to play only fold and call. Allowing fold
only later in the game does not seem to be beneficial, since
the ability to exploit the information LBR learns during the
hand is very limited. Most of the exploitation of LBR against
all bots is realized with only using a single pot-bet option
(“fcpa” row in Table 3). For Hyperboreans, exploitability is
further increased by adding more actions, but adding actions
beyond the actions used in the abstract game (on-tree) helps
only with the 2013 version and does not help at all for the
2014 version. For Slumbot and Act1, we do not know the
exact betting abstraction used in their abstract game, but the
betting options in “fcpa” are almost always included. If these
bets are included, as in case of Hyperboreans, there is no
need for any translation, the play will never leave the pre-
computed abstract tree and all the exploitability is caused
only by the errors in the card abstraction. Recent APCP bots
are generally well converged within their abstract games.
The least exploitable bot in these experiments is Act1,
even though it was beaten in one-on-one play by Slumbot
in the competition. It confirms that as with full-game best
response, even LBR may not be indicative of actual one on
one performance (and vice versa).
The experiments with ACPC bots were performed on a
cluster of AMD Opteron 6172 nodes with 24 cores, 32 GB
of RAM and the strategies on a shared network drive. Typ-
ically, we were running 10-20 instances of LBR on each
node in batches of 1000 hands. One batch for fold-call bet-
ting completed within half an hour, one batch of 56 bets ex-
periments generally took up to 8 hours. Since an important
bottle neck is the disk/network bandwidth which is further
improved by caching, the variance on required resources
is rather large. Still, computing good LBR values even for
complicated strategies with endgame solving is perfectly
feasible with the presented method.
Full cards
The last bot we evaluate is a large bot that uses complete
non-abstracted information about the cards and the sparse
“fcpa” betting abstraction. It plays a slightly smaller game
with a 100 BB stack. The results on this bot (Table 3) show
that LBR does not realize the actual best response and can
even be substantially beaten (i.e., an uninformative lower
bound approximation). When restricted to the same “fcpa”
abstraction used in the opponent’s abstraction, a full (non-
local) best response shows the opponent is exploitable for
90 mBB/h, while LBR loses 536 mBB/h. However, the so-
lution with “fcpa” abstraction is not sufficient to ensure low
exploitability in the whole game with existing translation
techniques. With hard translation used in bets off-tree, LBR
wins 2403 mBB/h against this bot using 56 bets only in the
last two rounds of the game. Soft translation seems to mit-
igate this problem a little, but definitely does not solve it.
Using sampled soft translation with 10 samples for estimat-
ing the strategy, LBR on the last two rounds is winning 1981
± 224. The larger confidence interval is caused by playing
fewer hands, since even the look-up in the huge compressed
strategy without card abstraction is expensive. Note that not
all 56 actions are necessary to see the high exploitability us-
ing LBR. It is sufficient to use several bets out of the original
betting abstraction. For example, the bot with hard transla-
tion looses 1849 mBB/h with only fold, call, min-bet, 2, 4, 8
times pot bet, and the all in bet.
Conclusions
This paper presents the Local Best Response method for fast
approximation of exploitability of large poker strategies. If
a bot is able to provide a strategy for all hands it could hold
in a specific public state of the game within a reasonable
time (i.e., minutes), this method can generally be used to
approximate its exploitability. This is also the case for all
published endgame solving techniques, which resolve a sub-
game for all possible private hands at once.
Using this method we show that the existing poker bots,
including the second and the third best performing bots in
the ACPC in 2016, all have exploitability substantially larger
than folding all hands. The bots that use card abstraction
are losing over 3 big blinds per hand on average against
their worst case opponent. Exploitability can be reduced by
not using card abstraction, but that necessarily leads to us-
ing a very sparse betting abstraction, which can be heavily
exploited as well. Therefore, we assume that a substantial
paradigm shift is necessary to create bots that would closely
approximate equilibrium in full no-limit Texas hold’em.
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